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The underlying structure of futures market depth* 
Abstract 
The lack of sufficient market depth particularly in many newly initiated futures markets results in rela-
tively high hedging costs, and this inhibits the growth of futures contract volume. In this article the 
underlying structure of futures market depth is analyzed, from which a two dimensional market depth 
measure is derived. Understanding the underlying structure provides the management of the exchange 
with a framework in which they can improve their market depth, and hedgers can obtain a better 
understanding of their market depth risk. The managerial implications of our findings are demonstrated 
empirically. 
A key aspect of futures market performance is the degree of liquidity in the market 
(Cuny, 1993). The relation between market depth and futures contract success has 
been thoroughly investigated in the literature (Black, 1986). A futures market is 
considered liquid if traders and participants can buy or sell futures contracts quickly 
with little price effect as a consequence of their transactions. However, in thin 
markets, transactions of individual hedgers may have significant price effects and may 
therefore result in substantial 'transaction costs' (Thompson, Waller and Seibold, 
1993). 
* The authors wish to thank the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange (ATA) for its 
financial support. We are indebted to the Clearing Corporation (NLKKAS), especially to 
Rolf Wevers, for invaluable data. Furthermore, we would like to thank the Board of 
Directors of the ATA, the management of the European Options Exchange and the 
participants of Chicago Board of Trade 1996 9th Annual European Futures Research 
Symposium, especially Paul Dawson of the City University Business School, for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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These transaction costs are the premiums that traders are forced to pay or the 
discounts they are forced to accept in order to establish or close out futures positions 
(Ward and Behr, 1983). Although, to some extent, hedgers can take positions that 
offset each other, a futures market normally must create more market depth in the 
form of attracting additional traders if it is to become truly successful. In the 
literature four dimensions of liquidity are distinguished: immediacy, resiliency, width 
and depth (Berkman, 1993). Immediacy refers to how quickly trades of a given size 
can be done at a given cost. Resiliency refers to the responsiveness of new orders to 
price changes caused by temporary order flow imbalances initiated by uninformed 
traders. Width - often synonymous with liquidity - is represented by the bid-ask spread 
for a given number of futures. The bid-ask spread as a measure of width has some 
limitations. The price may change between the moment the market maker buys and 
sells, and the trader can earn much more or much less than the spread quoted at the 
time of the first transaction suggests. Hence, the trader faces costs due to changes in 
the bid-ask spread. Yet these costs are the essence of market liquidity (Grossman and 
Miller, 1988). Therefore, we examine the fourth dimension of liquidity: market depth. 
Market depth refers to the number of securities that can be traded at given bid and 
ask quotas (Berkman, 1993; Harris 1990). The concept of market depth represents a 
dimension of market liquidity that does not suffer from the limitations of the bid-ask 
spread as a dimension of liquidity (Kyle, 1985). 
The contribution of our article is threefold. First, we investigate the price path caused 
by (temporary) order imbalances (i.e. insufficient market depth). Second, the article 
puts forward the underlying structure of market depth and proposes a measure of 
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market depth. Third, we discuss the managerial implications of our model for the 
management of the futures exchange. 
The article is organized as follows: Section I describes the concept of market depth. 
Section II gives a brief review of liquidity measures. Section HI hypothesizes an 
underlying structure of market depth from which a market depth price path model is 
derived. The remainder of the article is concerned with the application of our model. 
Section IV describes the dataset and gives some data transformations. Section V 
presents an analysis of market depth for three selected futures contracts and 
subsequently the managerial implications for the management of the futures exchange 
are discussed. Results and main conclusions are summarized in Section VI. 
I. Market depth in futures markets 
Kyle (1985) defines market depth as the volume of unanticipated order flows able to 
move prices by one unit. Market depth risk is the risk the hedger faces of a sudden 
price fall or rise due to order imbalances. This risk seems important to systematic 
hedgers, particularly in thin markets. Sudden price changes can occur where both long 
and short hedges are concerned. If a relatively small market sell (buy) order arrives, 
the transaction price will be the bid (ask) price. For a relatively large market sell 
(buy) order, several transaction prices are possible, at lower and lower (higher and 
higher) prices, depending on the size of the order and the number of traders 
available. If the sell order is large, the price should keep falling to attract additional 
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traders to take the other side of the order. Given a constant equilibrium price, in a 
deep market, relatively large market orders result in a smaller divergence of 
transaction prices from the underlying equilibrium price than in a thin market. 
According to Lippman and McCall (1986) the deepness of the market for a 
commodity increases with the frequency of offers. The generally known factors that 
determine market depth, and liquidity in general, include: the amount of trading 
activity1 or the time rate of transactions during the trading period; the ratio of trading 
activity by speculators and scalpers to overall trading activity; equilibrium price 
variability; the size of a market order (transaction); expiration-month effect; and 
market structure2 (Black, 1986; Thompson and Waller, 1988; Christie and Schultz, 
1994; Chan and Lakonishok, 1995; Christie and Schultz, 1995). Hasbrouck and 
Schwartz (1988) report a relation between market depth and the trading strategies of 
market participants. Passive participants wait for the opposite side of their trade to 
arrive, but the active ones seek immediate transaction. Passive participants may avoid 
depth costs, whereas active ones generally incur depth costs. Some exchanges monitor 
temporary order imbalances, i.e.,market depth risk, and slow down the trade process 
if these are present (Affleck-Graves, Hegde and Miller, 1994). For example, an order 
book official issues warning quotas when trade execution results in price changes that 
are larger than minimums predescribed by the exchange, and halt trading when order 
execution results in price changes that exceed exchange-mandated maximums 
(Lehmann and Modest, 1994). 
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H. Liquidity measures: a brief review 
Previous research suggests measures of liquidity on the basis of indices, usually 
representing some weighting of trading activity (Working, 1960; Larson, 1961; Powers, 
1979; Ward and Behr; 1974, Ward and Dasse; 1977). An important element in these 
measures is the proportion of hedging to speculative trading volumes. Several 
researchers (Roll, 1984; Gloston and Milgrom; 1985, Thompson and Waller; 1987, 
Stoll; 1989, Smith and Whaley; 1994) propose methods for an indirect estimation of 
liquidity costs. A liquidity cost proxy based on the estimated covariance of prices has 
been introduced by Roll (1984). Another accepted proxy for the bid-ask spread has 
been proposed by Thompson and Waller (1988), who suggest that the average 
absolute value of price changes is a direct measure of the average execution cost of 
trading in a contract. Smith and Whaley (1994) use a method of moments estimator 
to determine the bid-ask spread. This estimator uses all successive price change data, 
and assumes that observed futures transaction prices are equally likely to occur at bid 
and ask. 
Market depth measures are rather scarce. Brorsen (1989) uses the standard deviation 
of the log price changes as a proxy for market depth. Lehmann and Modest (1994) 
study market depth by examining the adjustment of quotas to trades and the 
utilization of the chui kehai trading mechanism on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, where 
the chui kehai are warning quotas when a portion of the trade is executed at different 
prices. Utilizing the chui kehai trading mechanism can give an indication of market 
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depth, but cannot be used to measure it. Other researchers such as Bessembinder and 
Seguin (1993) use both price volatility and open interest as a proxy for market depth. 
These market depth measures implicitly assume a linear price path and for that 
reason provide limited insight into the underlying structure of market depth. In our 
view, the understanding of market depth can be improved if the market depth 
measure reveals the underlying price path caused by the thinness of the market. 
Market depth is usually analyzed by determining the slope dPF/dQ, where PF is the 
futures price and Q is the quantity traded. Presumably, the price path will not be 
linear, particularly not for large orders. 
It is important to note that the price changes dPF in which we are interested are 
caused by order imbalances which, in turn, are caused by the characteristics of the 
futures exchange structure (i.e., the trading system and the rules of the exchange). 
There is a large volume of research in the literature (e.g. French and Roll, 1986; 
Fama, 1991; Stein, 1991; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 
1994; Oliver and Verrechia, 1994; Hiraki et al., 1995) on information, market 
efficiency and market liquidity. Information in these articles refers to information 
concerning fundamental economic factors (supply and demand factors of the 
underlying 'commodity' of the futures contract traded). Theoretically, we can split 
price changes in changes due to fundamental economic factors and changes due to 
the fact that there is a temporary order imbalance. In this study we will concentrate 
on the latter. 
65 
In the literature there are no measures that reflect the shape of the price path due to 
order imbalances, while it is this shape that provides insight into the underlying 
structure of market depth. Insight in the underlying structure of market depth is 
especially relevant to new commodity exchanges in Western and Eastern Europe 
because of the smaller scale of these exchanges (Kilcollin and Michael, 1993). 
Furthermore, the underlying structure of market depth is an important issue for the 
clearing houses with respect to the system of margining (Gemmill, 1994; Goldberg 
and Hachey, 1992). Insight into the underlying structure of market depth in 
combination with improvements in computer and telecommunications technology will 
lead to improvements in the structure of futures markets and financial institutions in 
general (Merton, 1995). For that reason we argue that it is necessary to determine the 
underlying process of market depth in order to compare futures markets with respect 
to market depth. With knowledge of this process we are able to distinguish different 
dimensions of market depth. Revealing these dimensions will help the management of 
the futures exchange in dealing with the problem of a lack of market depth. 
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m . Market depth model 
We hypothesize that the price path arising from order imbalances can be 
characterized by an S-shaped curve. During the occurrence of such an S-curve the 
equilibrium price change is assumed to be constant. 
It is assumed that the price path is downward-sloping in the case of a sell order 
imbalance and upward-sloping in the case of a buy order imbalance (Working, 1977; 
Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993). The 
characteristic set of parameters describing the model can be interpreted as a measure 
of specific aspects of market depth. 
We assume that the market depth price path consists of four phases, namely a 
sustainable phase, a lag adjustment phase, a restoring phase, and a recovery phase. 
Although we assume this four phase structure to hold for both upward- and 
downward-sloping price paths, we confine our discussion to a downward-sloping price 
path. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
III.A. Sustainable Phase (I) 
In the first phase the first contracts are sold at or near the bid price because of 
outstanding bids in brokers' order books. In this phase the already existing bids are 
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The market depth price path is caused by frictions in the market structure which 
includes the trading system and the rules of the exchange. The quality of the market 
information generated by the trading system regarding high price, low price, last price, 
size of last trade etc. is crucial for these frictions and consequently for the market 
depth price path (see Domowitz, 1993a,b) for a description of trading systems and 
their impact on market depth). 
The S-shaped price path can only be identified ex post. Well-known theory with 
respect to market efficiency would suggest that the price would not adjust in a 
predictable way (Fama, 1991). However, at the moment that the price changes the 
participants are not able to identify whether the price movement is due to 
fundamental economic factors causing a change of the equilibrium price or due to a 
lack of market depth generated by market frictions caused by the trading system 
itself. Our findings have important managerial implication for the management of the 
futures exchange, both for the 'floor' and the clearing house. In Section V we will 
elaborate on these managerial implications. 
A priori we do not assume that the downward-sloping S-shaped price path is exactly 
the reverse of the upward-sloping price path. It is possible, for example, that there are 
many stop-loss buy orders and hardly any stop-loss sell ones and vice versa, thus 
causing dissimilarity between upward-sloping and downward-sloping price paths (Chan 
and Lakonishok, 1993). Nor do we assume the length of the four phases to be equal. 
In a market that is not able to absorb orders near the equilibrium price, for example, 
Phase I will become rudimentary. 
12 
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III. E. Mathematical Specification of the Model 
In the mathematical model both sell and buy orders (downward- and upward-sloping 
price paths) are taken into account. An upward-sloping S-shaped path may well be 
approximated by a Gompertz curve, since this curve has a non-symmetrical S-shape 
and thus, does not impose certain restrictions on the length of the different phases 
previously described (Franses, 1994a). The Gompertz model is a growth curve and, 
therefore, can only be used to describe an upward-sloping price path. However, 
subtracting a downward-sloping price path from an appropriate constant may establish 
an upward-sloping price path which will cover the four phases. As a consequence, 
after transforming the data, the price path will always be upward-sloping. We can 
describe the transformed price series using the Gompertz model given by 
(1) TPFt = oexp(-j3exp(-Ô0) 
where TPFt is the transformed price of futures contract i (j. = 0,l,2,...,n), such that 
TPF0 is equal to the minimum tick size, and a,ß and Ô are positive parameters. Since 
the price path is restricted to start in the minimum tick size, the parameter ß is 
determined by a and the minimum tick size: ß= ln(a/r), where r denotes the 
minimum tick size. The parameters a and ô of the Gompertz model capture two 
dimensions of market depth. The first dimension, represented by a minus the 
minimum tick size, indicates how far the price rises (falls) as a consequence of a lack 
of market depth. The second dimension, presented by Ô, has a one-to-one relation to 
the rate of adjustment, which, as we will show below, is equal to [1 - exp(-ô)], 
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cf. Chow (1967) and Franses (1994a,b). This rate of adjustment may be translated 
into a cost in terms of price risk; the futures price may change before actual order 
execution. The underlying structure of market depth can be visualized as shown in 
Figures 3 and 4. 
Taking natural logarithms of (1) yields 
(2) ln(TPFt = lna-j3exp(-&) 
A convenient representation of the Gompertz process is obtained by subtracting 
IniTPF^) from (2) which after some rewriting using (1), gives, 
(3) Dln(rPFi) = [1 - exp(-6)][lna - foCTPF^)] 
where D is the first order differencing filter defined by Dz, = z, - ziA. Equation (3) is 
of particular interest because it can be interpreted as a partial price adjustment 
model. In order to see this, note that 0 < [1 - exp(-ô)] < 1. As a consequence, 
although a will always exceed TPFt, \n(TPF) is rising toward Loa at a constant rate of 
adjustment [1 - exp(-ô)]. For instance, if [1 - exp(-ô)] = 0.1, then it will take much 
more contracts to reach a certain price rise than in the situation where [1 - exp(-ô)] = 
0.5, ceteris paribus. Similarly, if lna exceeds ]n(TPF) by one percent of \n(TPF), then 
ln(rPFj) will increase by [1 - exp(-ô)] x 100 percent. We can additionally interpret 
exp(-ô) as the elasticity of TPF; with respect to TPFiA. 
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The model in (3) may be extended on two fronts. First, relation (3) is an 
approximation to the transformed price series. Hence, we add a disturbance term ut 
to (3) under the assumption that w, ~ EQXO.o2!,). Second, notice that the price 
observations per futures contract cannot be described by a single curve like the one 
depicted in Figure 1, but by a sequence of such curves as in Figure 2, where an 
upward-sloping curve is always succeeded by a downward-sloping one and the other 
way round. As a consequence, our data series on the transformed price consists of a 
panel (not restricted to being balanced) of upward-sloping curves in chronological 
order. We may wish to allow the parameters to vary between really upward- and 
actually downward-sloping curves. To meet those ends, (3) is modified as in 
(4) DWTPFJ = xs - TMTPFCM ) + uä 
s.t. u ~ IID(0,<r\) 
where TT, = [1 - expC-ô^lna,, TS = [1 - exp(-ô,)], / = 0,1 nc with c = 1 , . . . ,# and s 
is an index for actually upward- (5=1) and downward-sloping (5=2) curves. H denotes 
the number of curves that form the graph of the futures price as in Figure 1. Notice 
that our dataset on TPFd consists of N = Lj=lH rij observations. In the next section 
more details are given on how we obtain these observations. 
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III. F. Estimation of the model 
In our theoretical model we assume that during the occurrence of an S-shaped price 
path, the equilibrium price is constant and hence that the S-shaped price path is 
solely attributed to temporary order imbalances. However, actual price changes in the 
futures market result from both temporary order imbalances and from supply and 
demand factors of the underlying commodity of the futures contract. As a result 
estimation of the model on the basis of real futures market data might invalidate the 
assumption of a constant equilibrium price during every separate S-shaped price path. 
This problem becomes less relevant as the S-curve, due to temporary imbalances, 
takes place in a shorter period of time. In our case we dispose of transaction specific 
data and S-shaped price paths occur in a very short period of time, say within a 
matter of minutes. Since the effect of fundamental economic factors occurs over a 
much longer period of time than a few minutes, we might expect that during such a 
downward-sloping or upward-sloping price path the price change due to fundamental 
economic factors i.e. the change of the equilibrium price is negligible compared to the 
price change due to order imbalances. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
After identifying the individual price paths, we subtract the observations of each 
downward-sloping price path from the price at which the curve started, such that all 
curves become upward sloping. In order to eliminate the general price level effect, we 
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shift the curves downward, such that each curve starts at the minimum tick size (i.e. 
each S-curve, as displayed in the window of Figure 2, is shifted downward to the 
minimum tick size). In doing so we also correct for differences in equilibrium price 
between S-curves. 
IV. Data 
In order to illustrate the usefulness of our model, we applied it to data from the 
Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange (ATA). This exchange is one of the largest 
agricultural futures exchanges in Europe. The trading system employed by the ATA is 
the open outcry system. There are no scalpers on the trading floor and all orders 
enter the trading floor via brokers. Brokers are only allowed to trade by order of a 
customer. There is no central order book on the ATA. The broker has only insight 
into his/her own order book. There is no information on the order book of other 
brokers. The customer (hedger or speculator) has no information on outstanding 
orders. 
Potatoes and hogs are traded on the ATA. The potato futures contract is a relatively 
successful one in the sense that the volume generated (about 200,000 contracts 
annually) is large relative to competitive potato contracts elsewhere in Europe (such 
as the potato futures traded on the London Commodity Exchange and on the Marché 
à Terme International de France). The annual volume is small, however, when 
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compared with agricultural futures traded in the United States. Hogs futures are not 
successful as far as their volume (about 30,000 contracts annually) is concerned. 
We use real-time transaction-specific data for three futures contracts: potato contract 
delivery April 1995, and hog contract deliveries August and September 1995. From 
the data it is not clear where the exact split between an increasing and decreasing 
price path should be imposed when two or more contracts in between are traded at 
the same price. Therefore, to determine the split we apply the following procedure: 
for an odd number of contracts traded at the same price we use the middle contract, 
and for an even number of constant contracts we employ a random assignment with 
equal probabilities. 
V. Empirical results 
In this section we present parameter estimates that are obtained by applying ordinary 
least squares to (4). From these estimates and the fact that TPF0 = aexp(-jS) equals 
the known minimum tick size, we can simply derive the parameter estimates of the 
characteristic Gompertz curves. In the case of potatoes, the minimum tick size is 
equal to 0.10 Dutch guilders and for hogs it is some 0.005 Dutch guilders. 
The regression results for the potato futures contracts are presented in Table 1. In 
Table 4 we present the companion parameter estimates of the characteristic 
Gompertz curves to be discussed later on in this section. From Table 1 we observe 
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that the estimates of the rate of adjustment parameter are equal to 0.051 and 0.059. 
Note that these estimates lie within the (0-1) interval, which is in accordance with our 
model. The values of the corresponding t statistics are high, and are also highly 
significant when compared with the percentiles that have to be taken into 
consideration in the context of Dickey-Fuller tests (Stewart, 1991; Fuller, 1976). The 
Durbin-Watson statistic does not indicate any misspecification. In spite of its low 
value, the R2 is significantly different from zero, as indicated by the F statistic. The 
intercept of actual downward-sloping curves is, however, not significant. Nevertheless, 
according to Table 4 this does not lead to the insignificance of the characteristic 
Gompertz curve parameters. To see whether one single market depth path for both 
upward- and downward-sloping price paths of potatoes suffices, we test the hypothesis 
HQ: {WJ = 7T2 = x and r1 = T2 = T}. H0 is rejected. Therefore, the market depth for 
potato futures contracts, delivery April 1995, significantly differs between periods of 
price rise and price fall. 
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Table 1. Regression Results for Potato Futures Delivery April 1995 
Coefficient 
* j 
* 2 
T j 
T2 
Estimate 
0.016 
0.001 
0.051 
0.059 
Degrees of freedom 46786 
R2 
F(4,46786) 
Standard error t-value 
0.002 6.621 
0.003 0.253 
0.002 31.805 
0.003 29.992 
i, from 46790 observations 
0.099 Probability of F 
1283 Durbin-Watson 
p-value 
0.000 
0.800 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
statistic 1.914 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the hog futures contract, delivery August 
1995. Since the hypothesis Ho cannot be rejected, the market depth for hog futures, 
delivery August 1995, is characterized by a single Gompertz curve, the parameter 
estimates of which are to be found in Table 4. Compared with Table l,the statistics 
in Table 2 lead to similar conclusions with respect to the performance of the 
regression. 
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Table 2. Regression results for hogs futures delivery August 1995 
Coefficient Estimate Standard error t-value 
T -0.478 0.035 -13.813 
T 0.147 0.008 18.646 
Degrees of freedom 2739, from 2741 observations 
R2 0.249 Probability of F 
F(2,2739) 454 Durbin-Watson statistic 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.811 
Table 3 shows the estimates regarding the market for hog futures contracts, delivery 
September 1995. The results are quite similar to those in Table 2. Again, we cannot 
reject HQ. The parameter estimates of the characteristic Gompertz curve that can be 
derived from the parameter estimates in Table 3 are presented in Table 4. 
Table 3. Regression results for hogs futures delivery September 1995 
Coefficient Estimate Standard error t-value 
TT -0.339 0.032 -10.581 
T 0.108 0.007 14.750 
Degrees of freedom 2314, from 2316 observations 
R2 0.200 Probability 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
of F 
F(2,2314) 288 Durbin-Watson statistic 
0.000 
1.855 
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Table 4. Estimates of the characteristic parameters describing the underlying 
dimensions of market depth 
markets 
Potatoes futures contracts, 
delivery April 1995 
Hogs futures contracts, 
delivery August 1995 
Hogs futures contracts, 
delivery September 1995 
slope 
of actual 
curves 
negative 
positive 
both negative 
and positive 
both negative 
and positive 
parameter estimates 
characteristic 
a 
1.013 
(0.003) 
1.374 
(0.012) 
0.039 
(0.008) 
0.044 
(0.011) 
Gompertz curve(I) 
Ô 
0.060 
(0.002) 
0.053 
(0.002) 
0.159 
(0.007) 
0.115 
(0.007) 
(1) standard errors in parentheses 
We will discuss the empirical results and illustrate how the management of the 
exchange can use this information to improve the performance of the futures 
exchange with regard to its market depth. For this purpose, we draw the characteristic 
Gompertz curves for the upward-sloping and downward-sloping potato futures price 
path (see Figure 3) and for the hogs futures price paths (see Figure 4), using the 
parameter estimates in Table 4. In each of the two figures both dimensions of market 
depth are visualized simultaneously. Several conclusions can be drawn from this. 
[INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4] 
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The upward- and downward-sloping Gompertz curves for potato futures have 
dissimilar shapes. The distance - indicating how far the price falls or rises due to 
order imbalances - is quite large compared with the general price level. This might be 
due to the absence of scalpers. In order to improve the absorption capacity, the ATA 
might consider allowing scalpers on the floor. The rate of price change (dimension 2) 
is higher for the upward-sloping price path than for the downward-sloping price path. 
This can be explained by the fact that there are differences between the number of 
stop-loss buy and stop-loss sell orders. Since the curves do not intersect, as displayed 
in Figure 3, we may conclude that the futures market is deeper in the case of a sell 
order imbalance than where there is a buy order imbalance. The problem of the high 
rate of (adverse) price changes at the ATA might be solved by implementing a 
mechanism for slowing down the trade process if order imbalances do occur and to 
improve market depth by reporting these. Also the order book information can be 
improved. At the ATA the order books of the different brokers are not linked and 
the customer has no information with regard to outstanding orders. An order book 
mechanism that allows potential participants to view real-time limit orders, displaying 
the desired prices and quantities at which participants would like to trade, will 
improve the rate of adjustment and the distance between the lower and upper 
bounds. 
The upward- and downward-sloping Gompertz curves are similar for both hogs 
deliveries. The main difference between the two hogs futures with respect to market 
depth is caused by dimension 2, the rate of price change. This dimension prevails 
more for hog delivery in August than for hog delivery in September. From Figure 4 
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we observe that the price paths intersect, indicating that for relative small orders 
September delivery is deeper than August, whereas for large orders August delivery is 
deeper. 
VI. Conclusions and further research 
In contrast to the existing market depth measures we conjecture that the market price 
depth path has an S-shape in which four phases can be distinguished: the sustainable 
price phase, the lag adjustment phase, the restoring phase and the recovery phase. 
The S-shaped price path may well be approximated by the Gompertz curve, which 
allows for a non-symmetrical S-shape and hence, does not impose certain restrictions 
on the length of the different phases. The two parameters of our model represent two 
dimensions of market depth. The first dimension represents the distance between the 
upper and lower bounds, i.e. indicates how far the price falls (rises) due to a lack of 
market depth. The second dimension indicates the rate at which price falls or rises. 
Our market depth measure has convenient characteristics. First, it provides insight 
into the underlying structure of market depth and the management of the futures 
exchange and gives guidelines for improving market depth. Second, our measure can 
be used to compare competitive futures contracts. Third, the market depth model can 
simply be estimated. Furthermore, since our measure can be presented in a graphical 
way, it is relatively easy to interpret. 
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We applied our model to the potato and hogs futures traded on the Amsterdam 
Agricultural Futures Exchange. We found that both the distance between the upper 
and lower bounds of the price path and the rate of the price change is high, indicating 
a lack of market depth. The current trading system - no scalpers and no central order 
book information - contributes to this situation. Redesigning the trading system in 
order to lower the distance between the upper and lower bounds of the price path 
and the rate of the price change is recommended. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to be aware of the following factors. 
First, as we have indicated, our model requires transaction-specific data. Transaction-
specific data enable us to identify individual downward-sloping price paths and 
individual upward-sloping price paths. We shift the individual upward- and downward-
sloping price paths, such that each price path starts at the minimum tick size. This 
means that the price path, as displayed in the window of Figure 1, is shifted 
downward to the minimum tick size in order to eliminate the price level effect (trend) 
caused by fundamental economic factors. Furthermore, we expect that during such a 
downward-sloping price path or upward-sloping price path, which takes place within a 
few minutes, price change due to fundamental economic factors is negligible 
compared to the price change due to order imbalances i.e. we may expect that during 
such a short period of time the equilibrium price does not change. 
Second, our research is restricted to one futures trading system. In order to draw 
conclusions with respect to the relation between the two distinguished market depth 
dimensions and the futures market structure, other futures trading systems should be 
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incorporated into the analysis. Measuring the market depth dimensions for different 
kinds of trading systems would provide more information regarding the relationships 
between the market depth dimensions and the different elements of trading systems. 
Research addressing these two points should be an interesting avenue to explore in 
the future. 
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Notes 
1. In the literature trading activity is often used as an indicator for market liquidity. 
However, Park and Sarkar (1994) showed that, in the case of the S&P 500 index 
futures contract, changes in trading activity levels may be a poor indicator of changes 
in market liquidity. 
2. This list does not pretend to be exhaustive. 
3. The resistance price level marks the upper and lower-bound between which the 
price fluctuates according to the participants if the equilibrium price is constant. The 
equilibrium price is determined by fundamental economic factors. 
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Figure 1. Price pattern of a sell order in a thin market. 
Figure 1 depicts the price path of a sell order. On the vertical axis the futures price per contract traded is 
given where PF is the price realized when entering the futures market. On the horizontal axis the 
successive contracts traded are given, where the serial number of the futures contract is denoted by i . 
j=l is the first contract traded, j=2 is the second contract traded and so on. 
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Figure 2. Futures price path. 
Figure 2 depicts a graph of the futures prices per contract in chronological order. On the vertical axis the 
futures price per contract traded is given, where PF is the price realized when entering the futures 
market. On the horizontal axis the successive contracts traded are given, where the serial number of the 
futures contract is denoted by j . i=\ is the first contract traded, j=2 is the second contract traded and 
so on. 
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Fïgure 3. The Gompertz curve for the potato futures contract delivery April. 
The figure depicts the Gompertz curve for increasing and decreasing price paths. On the vertical axis the 
futures price per contract traded is given, where pf is the price realized when entering the futures 
market. On the horizontal axis the prices of successive contracts traded are given, where the serial 
number of the futures contract is denoted by j . i=\ is the first contract traded, j=2 is the second 
contract traded and so on. 
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Figure 4. The Gompertz curve for hogs futures contracts deliveries August and 
September. 
The figure depicts the Gompertz curves for hogs delivery August and hogs delivery September. No 
distinction is made between upward- and downward-sloping price paths, because they can be described by 
the same Gompertz curve. On the vertical axis the futures price per contract traded is given, where pp is 
the price realized when entering the futures market. On the horizontal axis the successive contracts 
traded are given, where the serial number of the futures contract is denoted by i . i=i is the first 
contract traded, j=2 is the second contract traded and so on. 
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